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UNJUST ENRICHMENT FOR PATENT
INFRINGEMENT: A NOVEL IDEA?
A person who has been unjustly enriched at the
expense of another is required to make restitution to
the other.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Damages for patent infringement are determined under 35 U.S.C.
§ 284, which states, "[u]pon finding for the claimant the court shall
award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the
infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the
use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest
and costs as fixed by the court."2 Federal courts, in struggling to
determine the meaning of this provision, have produced confusing
and uncertain case law. Some cases have limited a patentee to a
reasonable royalty, while, on indistinguishable facts, others have
allowed lost profits. The recent Federal Circuit cases of Rite-Hite
Corp. v. Kelley Co.' and King Instruments Corp. v. Perego4 further
muddied the waters and caused more debate. In both cases, the
Federal Circuit expanded lost profits awards to situations where
such recovery was previously unavailable. Thus, at the outset of
litigation, parties to a patent infringement suit lack indications of
what their rights and obligations may be.
The objective of this Note is to identify the problem as it exists
in the federal courts and to propose an alternative means of
calculating damages based on principles of restitution. Restitution-
ary recovery is based on a premise that unearned benefits should
not be kept by those who unlawfully acquire them.5 Similarly,
patent infringement remedies seek to restore the patentee and
infringer to the status quo ante the infringement. In light of these
I RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RETUTON § 1 (1936).
2 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994).
'774 F. Supp. 1514,21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (E.D. Wisc. 1991), modified, 56 F.3d 1538,
35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, ___U.S , 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995).
' 737 F. Supp. 1227, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1994 (D. Mass. 1990), affd, 65 F.3d 941, 36
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, - U.S. ., 116 S. Ct. 1675 (1996).
" Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1191, 1192-93 (1995).
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similar aims, the law of restitution, not surprisingly, contains
concepts analogous to such patent law recovery premises as
"reasonable royalty" and "lost profits."
The law of restitution will be a return to "first principles" and
will provide a concrete methodology of ascertaining when certain
types of recovery are appropriate. Most importantly, the law of
restitution will illustrate and justify recovery by a patentee of the
infringer's profits. Specifically, when one infringes on a patent, one
commits a tort; the retention of a tortiously acquired benefit is
unjust.' Damages 7 as derived from restitutionary principles are
consistent with the language of § 284, which states that damages
shall be "adequate to compensate for the infringement."8 Further,
restitution, the policy behind § 284, and the history of § 284 will
justify the awarding of an infringer's profits.9
Part II addresses the confusion that exists in American courts.
This Note will argue that the case law is inconsistent and haphaz-
ard. Part III discusses the history and development of the law of
restitution. Much of the discussion is theoretical. Rarely do
scholars on the topic discuss the underpinnings of the law of
restitution,1" and a treatment here may help the reader under-
stand the connection between patent infringement and restitution.
Part IV argues for the award of an infringer's profits as a remedy
for patent infringement. This Note will show that making a
restitutionary award does not require amending the statute but,
rather, requires that judges and practitioners understand the law
of unjust enrichment and that they take a second look at the
reasons why § 284 reads as it does today.
" Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1277, 1283
(1989).
7 
"Damages" here will be used generically. The term will refer to any loss suffered by the
patentee, as well as to profits gained by the infringer. The concept of what constitutes the
infringer's "profits" will be discussed infra.
8 35 U.S.C. § 284.
One question that remains unsettled in patent law is whether patent infringement
sounds in tort or in restitution. While some cases explicitly hold the former, some courts
have awarded damages in the latter. The law of restitution explains this inconsistency.
Emory University Professor Andrew Kull argues that, in practice, the distinction is
irrelevant. Interview with Andrew Kull, Professor of Law, Emory University, in Atlanta, Ga.
(Mar. 10, 1996).
'0 See Kull supra note 5.
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II. THE CONFUSION IN AMERICAN PATENT LAW
Under current law, a patentee in a patent infringement suit may
obtain three basic types of relief: an injunction,11 a reasonable
royalty, 2 and lost profits. 3 Each form of relief addresses a
different harm and stems from a different source. Courts normally
grant injunctions to terminate the harm altogether. The United
States Code provides explicitly for reasonable royalties, which
represent an amount equal to a royalty the infringer would have
paid the patentee had they negotiated a licensing agreement. 4
Finally, lost profits refer to the profits that the patentee would
have made "but for" the infringement. 5
A. REASONABLE ROYALTIES
Section 284 provides that damages recovered by a patentee shall
be "in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of
the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as
fixed by the court."' The Federal Circuit has interpreted that
phrase to mean "that the statute provides only the 'reasonable
royalty' floor below which no damages can fall in compensating the
patentee." 7 In other words, courts must award reasonable royal-
ties as the minimum compensation.
In determining a reasonable royalty, courts apply the "willing
buyer - willing seller test."1" A reasonable royalty constitutes the
'" 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1994).
2 35 U.S.C. § 284.
" "Lost profits" recovery is based on a judicially created doctrine emanating from § 284.
See, e.g., Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 197 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 726 (6th Cir. 1978).
14 35 U.S.C. § 284. See generally Panduit Corp., 575 F.2d 1152.
'5 King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853,863,226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 402 (Fed.
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
"35 U.S.C. § 284.
'7 Robert Cox, Recent Development, But How Far?: Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co.'s
Expansion of the Scope of Patent Damages, 3 J. OF INTELL. PROP. L. 327, 331 (1996) (citing
Del Mar Avionics, Inc. v. Quinton Instrument Co., 836 F.2d 1320, 1326,5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1255, (Fed. Cir. 1987)); Edward V. Filardi, The Adequacy of Compensation for Patent
Infringement - An Analysis of Monetary Relief Under 35 U.S.C. § 284, 3 FORDHAM ENT.
MEDIA & INTELL. PROP. L. F. 57, 58 (Autumn 1992).
'a Panduit Corp., 575 F.2d at 1157-58.
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amount an entrepreneur would willingly pay to produce and
market a patented item in order to achieve a reasonable profit."9
That is, the courts assume that the reasonable royalty is the
market royalty. Where a patentee is licensing to all those that
seek a license, the royalty method suffices to give the patentee
what he would have received had the infringer lawfully negotiated:
the reasonable royalty would be what the patentee charges to all its
licensees.20
However, the patent holder who chooses not to manufacture or
license the device, but only seeks to horde the technology, presents
a problematic scenario.2' The result is a legal anomaly: a fiction
is created whereby the willing buyer - willing seller test has no
relationship to the "willingness" of either party to reach an
agreement.22 Where the patentee chooses to horde the technology,
he opts not to license at any price. Further, limiting an award to
royalties rests on the "pretense that the infringement never
happened."' Yet, the infringement in itself gives the patentee a
cause of action; had there been no infringement, the patentee would
not have standing to sue. In the landmark decision of Panduit
Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc.,24 the Federal Circuit
properly noted that "the 'reasonable royalty' device conjures a
'willing' licensor and licensee, who like Ghosts of Christmas Past,
are dimly seen as 'negotiating' a 'license.' There is, of course, no
actual willingness on either side, and no license to do anything."21
Practically speaking, courts award reasonable royalties to those
patentees who are unable to show their actual damages,26 thus
19 d. (citing Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Overman Cushion Tire Co. 95 F.2d 978,
984, 37 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 479 (6th Cir. 1937), cert. dismissed, 306 U.S. 665 (1938) (citing
Rockwood v. General Fire Extinguisher Co., 37 F.2d 62, 66, 4 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 299 (2d Cir.
1930), appeal dismissed, 306 U.S. 665 (1938))).
' Filardi, supra note 17, at 80.21 Id. at 83.
' Andrew Coleman, Copyright Damages and the Value of the Infringing Use: Restitution-
ary Recovery in Copyright Infringement Actions, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 91, 112 (1993) (citing
Dawson, Restitution without Enrichment, 61 B.U.L. REV. 563, 614 (1981)).
2Id. at 112.
" Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1978).
25 Id. at 1159.
' Fredrick A. Lorig & David J. Meyer, Maximizing Patent Damages, 321 PRAC. L. INST.
367, 388 (Oct.-Nov. 1991). This rationale is inherently flawed because it places the burden
on the patentee to show his damages; the principle that "doubts are to be resolved against
the infringer" appears to be ignored in favor of resolution of doubts against the patentee.
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relegating the patent holder to receiving statutory damages only.2 7
Such plaintiffs include, as previously mentioned, those who choose
not to exploit their patents, and to remedy this situation, courts
have inflated the royalty award.2
This type of artifice poses three inconsistencies that elude
satisfactory explanation. First, acceptance of this definition of
"reasonable royalty" undermines the definition of "reasonable."
That is, the royalty is actually punitive in nature and is not market
based. Second, the phrase "adequate to compensate" is read out of
the statute since the non-licensing patentee can never be compen-
sated by a royalty. If royalties represent adequate compensation,
the patentee would have gone to the market to license his invention
on his own initiative. Third, such an inflated royalty, by definition,
cannot stem from the "willing buyer - willing seller" test.
Accepting, arguendo, that the notion of reasonable royalty is
based properly on a "willing buyer - willing seller" scenario, an
award of only a reasonable royalty is still inadequate because it
fails to discourage the infringer.' Royalties simply force the
patentee to issue a retroactive license,30 something the infringer
could not obtain in the marketplace. The reasonable royalty also
undermines the "strategic bargaining" position between parties. In
other words, because the patentee and infringer are the only two
in the market, there is an incentive for the license-seeker to in-
fringe.
3 1
TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp.32 illustrates one assessment of
"reasonable royalties.' 3a There, an inventor discovered that Dura
had infringed on his patent for a "Wheeled Vehicle Suspension"
21 Filardi, supra note 17, at 80.
' "In any event, the award should be greater than the ordinary royalty in the particular
industry--otherwise the infringer would have nothing to lose by infringing." Lorig, supra
note 26, at 389.
29 Filardi, supra note 17, at 80.30 Id.
Coleman, supra note 22, at 115. Even if there is more than one infringer, the rationale
would not change; in such a case, courts apply a market share theory. See, e.g., Lorig, supra
note 26, at 378-79.
2231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 525 (E.D. Mich. 1985), affd, 789 F.2d 895,229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 525
(Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986).
' See also Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc. 446 F.2d 295,170
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 369 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971) (discussing factors to be
considered in determining reasonable royalties).
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that enabled trucks to add axles to carry heavy loads.' Upon
discovering this, the patentee offered a license to Dura, but
negotiations between the parties terminated when Dura stated a
belief that the patent was invalid.' The inventor's assignee,
TWM, then sued Dura."6 The court stated that because no royalty
had been assigned (in any licensing agreement), the special master
must calculate the royalty. 7 The master took Dura's projected
profit of 52.7%, allowed Dura an allowance for overhead costs,
subtracted an industry standard net profit, and awarded the
remainder to TWM, a 30% royalty.' The master further deter-
mined that the infringement was willful and accordingly trebled the
award.39
On appeal, Dura contended that the royalty was excessive.
40
Finding the argument to be without merit, the Federal Circuit
emphasized that no limitations exist on the permissible analytical
approaches to determining reasonable royalties and stated that §
284 allows courts to calculate the amount of the royalty in any
manner that compensates for the infringement.41 Furthermore,
the court mentioned that a willing licensor and licensee certainly
might agree to a 30% royalty.42
The result in this case is troubling. First, the court used the
projected profits of the infringer as the basis for calculation, which
does not indicate what the infringer's actual profits would have
been. In other words, there may not necessarily be a relationship
between projected and actual profits. Also, the use of projected
profits is inconsistent with the patent holder's actual harm; actual
harm is hindsight damage, whereas projected profits are prospec-
tive. In 1989, the Federal Circuit shied away from this approach
and stated that royalties should be based not on profit margins but
4 TWM Mfg. Co., 789 F.2d at 897.
3Id.
wId
17 Id. at 899.
38 Id.
9TWM Mfg. Co., 789 F.2d at 902.
4 Id. at 899.41 Id. (citing Am Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476 (1964)).
42 Id. at 900.
128 [Vol. 4:123
6
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol4/iss1/6
PATENT INFRINGEMENT
rather on the hypothetical negotiations at the time of infringe-
ment.43
Second, use of the projected profits indicates that the court is
looking at the infringer's profit as a proxy for the harm to the
patentee. Consider a hypothetical scenario where the infringer
may have enjoyed economic success because of manufacturing
efficiency while the patentee was actually an inefficient producer.
Thus, had the patentee been in the marketplace, his profits would
be lower, and such a plaintiff's award is artificially inflated.
Third, by allowing Dura to keep its industry standard profits, the
company has been allowed to profit from the infringement"
despite its willful wrongdoing. Fourth, the court's statement that
the only limitation on the calculation of royalties is that the figure
must constitute adequate compensation assumes a 30% ceiling on
what the patentee would have charged for a license, thereby
ignoring the previous illusion of buyer-seller negotiations.
Fifth, in the above manner of awarding a 30% royalty, the court
actually applies unjust enrichment principles and makes Dura
disgorge most of its profits. Thus, the court is not true to the
reasonable royalty concept. Finally, the court seems to imply that
its reason for taking this approach is punitive in nature and that
making Dura disgorge all of its excess profits constitutes a just
response to the finding of willful infringement.' Such punitive
motives are inconsistent with the premise behind the "willing buyer
- willing seller" approach.
B. LOST PROFITS
In some patent infringement cases, the patentee seeks to recover
his lost profits. The justification for such an award begins with §
284 which states, "[ulpon finding for the claimant the court shall
award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the
infringement .... . Those "damages" are "full compensation for
' State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1580, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1026 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022 (1990) (citing Radio Steel & Mfg. Co. v.
MTD Prod., Inc. 788 F.2d 1554, 1557, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 431 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
" TWM Mfg. Co., 789 F.2d at 900.
4 id.
" 35 U.S.C. § 284.
19961 129
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'any damages' [the patentee] suffered as a result of the infringe-
ment."47 "Lost profits is an appropriate measure of damages only
where it can be shown that, 'but for' the infringement, the patent
owner would have made the infringing sales and, perhaps, could
have charged higher prices or incurred lower expenses." 8 Simply
stated, the patentee seeks traditional tort compensatory damages
for his harm.
Whether a patentee can receive his lost profits is an evidentiary
matter4 9 in that the patentee recovers lost profits if he can show
the quantum of those profits.' Where the plaintiff cannot prove
lost profits with respect to all the products sold by the infringer,
"lost profits [are] awarded where the proof is sufficient, and a
reasonable royalty [is] awarded for the remainder." 1
1. Panduit.5 2 In Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works,
Inc.,' the Federal Circuit enunciated a four prong test to deter-
mine if a plaintiff may recover lost profits.5' In order for the
patentee to present a prima facie case for a lost profits demand, "a
patent owner must prove: (1) demand for the patented product, (2)
absence of acceptable noninfringing substitutes, (3) his manufactur-
ing and marketing capability to exploit the demand, and (4) the
amount of the profit he would have made."' Simply stated, "the
patentee must first show a causal relationship between the
infringement and the lost sales, as well as show the amount of
profits that would have been made on those sales."
47 General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1983), 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
1185 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1587, 79th Cong. Seas., at 1 (1946), reprinted in 1946
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1386, 1387). Later, the argument will be made that the House Report has been
misunderstood. See discussion infra part IV.B.
," Filardi, supra note 17, at 73 (citing Water Technologies Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d
660, 671, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 968).
49 Lorig, supra note 26, at 370 (citing Water Technologies Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d
at 671-72).
wO Id.
51 Id. at 387.
52 For a recent treatment of Panduit and related cases see Cox, supra note 17, at 327.
Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978).
Filardi, supra note 17, at 74.
55Panduit Corp., 575 F.2d at 1156 (citing 3 R. White, PATENT LITIGATION: PROCEDURE
AND TACTICS § 9.03(2)).
' Cox, supra note 17, at 332 (citing King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853,
863 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986)).
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The terms "damages" and "causation" are subject to some
qualification.57 Basically, money made by the infringer constitutes
"profits," while money lost by the patentee as a result of the
infringement constitutes "damages."" With respect to the burden
of proof on causation, the patentee need only prove "to a reasonable
probability that the sale would have been made but for the
infringement."59 Difficulties that arise in the determination of
damages are "resolved against the infringer."6
Panduit has caused confusion, has been criticized widely, and has
been qualified repeatedly. For example, while some scholars feel
that the test is difficult for a patent holder to meet,"1 others have
suggested that the burden is easily satisfied. 2 Most likely, the
former view is correct,' particularly where the patentee has
multiple licensees,' chooses not to exploit the technology, or
restricts market availability of its product in order to inflate prices.
The first requirement of Panduit is that "demand for the
patented product" must exist.' Simply stated, the consuming
public must actually desire the patented product that the infringer
appropriated. A plaintiff may initially satisfy the requirement by
showing that the infringer in fact sold the patented product."
The defendant, however, may successfully defend by asserting a
"market expansion defense."67 In such a case, the infringer argues
that sales resulted from an additional feature that he himself
57 Note that the qualification for "damages" is a judicially developed qualification and is
not clear from § 284. The validity of this qualification will be examined infra. See discussion
infra part IV.
8 Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Replacement Tops, 377 U.S. 476, 505 (1964) (quoting
Duplate Corp. v. Triplex Safety Glass Co., 298 U.S. 448, 451 (1936)).
5 Lorig, supra note 26, at 373 (quoting Paper Converting Machine Co. v. Magna Graphics
Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 21, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 591 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
o Id. at 371 (quoting Ryco v. Ag-Bag, 857 F.2d 1418, 1428, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1323
(Fed. Cir. 1988)).
61 Filardi, supra note 17, at 73-74.
u Lorig, supra note 26, at 371 ("[The Federal Circuit has made it relatively easy for the
patent owner to establish his entitlement to lost profits").
6 See, e.g., Panduit Corp., 575 F.2d 1152.
"Filardi, supra note 17, at 73-74.
66 Panduit Corp., 575 F.2d at 1156.
6 Filardi, supra note 17, at 75.
7 Lorig, supra note 26, at 374 (citing Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d
1481, 1502 (D. Mass. 1990), modified, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1711 (D. Mass. 1991)).
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incorporated into the product." In other words, "but for" this
additional noninfringing feature, few, if any sales, would have been
realized. 9
The second requirement of the Panduit test is "an absence of
acceptable noninfringing substitutes 7 -- no other manufacturers
simultaneously produced a product that could substitute for the
invention infringed upon. Thus, if noninfringing substitutes do not
exist in the marketplace, a defendant may not successfully mitigate
his liability by arguing that customers would not have purchased
the patented invention anyway because other manufacturers made
acceptable, noninfringing, alternative products.7'
The viability of the "noninfringing substitutes" requirement is
questionable because some authority holds that where the substi-
tute product does not incorporate all of the patented features, the
substitute is not acceptable.72 That aside, there remains intuitive
difficulty with the requirement: the inventor obtains legal
protection by seeking a patent, and the requirement that his
recovery be based on the existence of noninfringing products
reduces his incentive to seek a patent, thereby undermining the
purpose of the patent laws. Further, the requirement places an
unjustifiable burden on the patentee, who must now demonstrate
once again that his invention is unique. The patentee already has
done so during the patent prosecution when he demonstrated that
his invention was not prior art.73
In order to mitigate this burden, some courts employ a market
share analysis. 74  Under this approach, the court pro-rates the
plaintiffs recovery based upon its percentage of dominance in the
existing market.75 This system, however, fails to protect the
68td.
9Id.70 Panduit Corp., 575 F.2d at 1156.
7 Lorig, supra note 26, at 376. See also Filardi, supra note 17, at 76.
" Lorig, supra note 26, at 376 (citing Radio Steel & Mfg. Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 788
F.2d 1554, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
" In this discussion of damages, it is assumed that the patent is valid and infringement
exists.
"' See Lorig, supra note 26, at 378 (citing Orthman Mfg. Corp. v. Chromalloy Am. Corp.,
512 F. Supp. 1284, 1292-93,210 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 364 (C.D. IlM. 1981) and State Indus. v. Mor-
Flo Indus., 883 F.2d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
75d
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inventor who did not choose to exploit his invention.76
The third requirement of Panduit mandates that the patentee
have the "manufacturing and marketing capability to exploit the
demand."77 The patentee need only have the potential to produce
enough product to meet demand, if he so desires. 7 In one case,
a court stated that a manufacturer had to "establish by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that it would have added the necessary
manufacturing capability."
79
This standard poses some difficulty when one considers elementa-
ry economic principles. Consider that the prevailing market price
for any product is determined where supply equals demand. In
some cases, the patentee will limit its own production to keep
prices high. Thus, because the inventor has a monopoly on the
market by virtue of the patent, he need not expand his manufactur-
ing capacity. In such a case, this requirement forces the patentee
who does not want to meet market demand and thus does not
desire to add manufacturing capacity to accept a "reasonable
royalty." At the other end, even if he does not intend to satisfy the
demand, a patentee may need to develop plans, and perhaps even
build capacity, just to meet this requirement in a suit. This
situation yields an inherently inefficient result because the
patentee will have idle production capacity.
At this point, one may appropriately address the exploitation
factor that this third requirement creates. The exploitation
requirement necessarily implies that those inventors who do not
exploit their patents can only receive a reasonable royalty.'
Further, at the time of invention, the plaintiff must contemplate
the defendant's use of the product."1 That is, a defendant must be
someone from whom the plaintiff would have sought payment ab
7' See Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 26 Cal. 3d 588 (1980) (for another application of market
share analysis).
7 Panduit Corp., 575 F.2d at 1156.
7
' Lorig, supra note 26, at 381 (citing King Instrument v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 864
(Fed. Cir. 1985)).
'Id. (citing Polaroid Corp., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1511).
so Filardi, supra note 17, at 58.
8'Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary
Impulse, 78 VA. L. REv. 149, 191 (1992). This type of analysis appears to contradict the
constitutional directive allowing for the exclusive use by inventors. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 8.
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initio.8 2  In Foster v. American Machine & Foundry Co.,' the
Second Circuit held that a plaintiff who did not manufacture can
receive only a reasonable royalty." As late as 1994, the Federal
Circuit held that manufacture of the item is necessary to lost
profits recovery." In that case, the plaintiff was unable to fulfill
this requirement and could not receive lost profits."
The final requirement is that the patent holder must establish
the profits he would have made."7 While this requirement is
facially valid, the courts have not clarified the method of calcula-
tion." At the threshold, lost profits computation should be
approximations and should provide the defendant with an allow-
ance for fixed costs.8 9 Some authority states that "[l]ost profits
include not only actual sales lost to an infringer, but foregone price
increases, price erosion damages, and loss of sales dependent on the
sale of the patented article."90 In Kalman v. Berlyn Corp.,91 the
Federal Circuit allowed compensation where the infringer's
activities caused the patentee to reduce his prices.' Previously,
in Panduit, the same court had held otherwise by reasoning that
the price reduction ultimately did not result in lost profits, because,
in response to decreased prices, the overall volume of sales had
increased, thereby compensating the plaintiff for any price
reduction.93
That appears to be unfair. Not allowing recovery for the price
erosion essentially penalizes the patentee for mitigating his
damages. Also, the patentee's capacity to mitigate his damages
should not provide a basis for allowing the infringer to benefit.
82 Gordon, supra note 81, at 189.
"492 F.2d 1317, 182 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 833.
Id. at 1320-21.
Kearns v. Chrysler Corp., 32 F.3d 1541, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1746 (Fed. Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, _U.S._, 155 S.Ct. 1392 (1995).
8 d. at 1551-52.
7Panduit Corp., 575 F.2d at 1156.88 Lorig, supra note 26, at 383.
89 Filardi, supra note 17, at 78.
go Lorig, supra note 26, at 383.
9' 914 F.2d 1473, 1485 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
Lorig, supra note 26, at 384 (citing Kalman v. Berlyn Corp., 914 F.2d 1473, 1485 (Fed.
Cir. 1990)).
93 Panduit Corp., 575 F.2d at 1157 (quoting special master's report).
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2. Undoing Panduit. Two recent cases appear to have under-
mined, or even annihilated, the Panduit test. While other cases
have refined the test," these cases, Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co.,
Inc.' and King Instruments Corp. v. Perego," involved an award
of lost profits in a manner that questions the underlying premises
of the Panduit test. Even though the cases have significantly
expanded the instances where lost profits may be awarded, they
also have dramatically increased the confusion surrounding the
particular circumstances where a patentee may recover lost profits.
More importantly, an infringer will be unable to know the true
scope of potential recovery by the patentee.
a. Rite-Hite. In Rite-Hite, Rite-Hite, the patentee, held a
patent for an automated vehicle restraint device, model ADL-
100.9 7 Rite-Hite also produced a manual device, model MDL-55,
which was also patented.98 Kelley, seeking to compete with Rite-
Hite, attempted to design around the patent for the MDL-55 and
make an automated competing device, 9 which was intended to
compete not with the MDL-55, but with the higher line ADL-
100.100 Despite its efforts, Kelley infringed on the MDL-55's
patent.101 Even though Rite-Hite did not assert that Kelley had
infringed the ADL-100's patent,10 2 Rite-Hite sought lost profits
with respect to both the MDL-55 and the ADL-100.10 3  The
company argued that, had Kelley's automated device not been
manufactured, Rite-Hite would have sold more of its manual device
(which was infringed) and would have realized more sales on the
automated device (which was not infringed). Rite-Hite is unique in
that "the court extended the scope of compensable lost profit
damages to include lost profits from the sale of devices not covered
For a thorough discussion of the refinements, see Cox, supra note 17, at 333-37.
774 F. Supp. 1514 (E.D. Wisc. 1991), modified, 56 F.3d 1538, (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, U.S._ (1995). See generally, Cox, supra note 17.
737 F. Supp. 1227 (D. Mass. 1990), affd en banc, 65 F.3d 941 (Fed.Cir. 1995).
Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, _ U.S.
-(1995).
9 Id.
s Id.
100 Id.1 Id. at 1544.
'2 Rite-Hite Corp., 56 F.3d at 1543.
103 Id.
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by the patent at issue in the suit. 1' 4
A reader of the opinion quickly sees an apparition of Justice
Cardozo and his opinion in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. °8 and
immediately recalls nightmares from the first year of law school.
The Rite-Hite court stated that, absent countervailing factors, a
foreseeable injury is compensable.'06 The court rejected Kelley's
view that, at most, Rite-Hite should only receive reasonable
royalties. 10 7 Kelley made the obvious argument when one consid-
ers Panduit in the background: "that to recover damages in the
form of lost profits a patentee must prove that, 'but for' the
infringement, [Rite-Hite] would have sold a product covered by the
patent in suit to the customers who bought from the infringer." °' s
In rejecting this argument, the Federal Circuit stated that
Panduit is a helpful but non-exclusive test for the determination of
lost profits."° Rite-Hite argued and the court appeared to accept
that there is no limit on lost profits awards so long as there is a
sufficient showing of causation-in-fact."1 0 With these statements
in mind, one wonders if Panduit is still a useful test.
The court significantly expanded the "but for" test. Though the
court did not explicitly say so, the test now resembles something of
a "substantial factor"-type test. First, the court said that "[t]o
recover lost profits damages, the patentee must show a reasonable
probability that, 'but for' the infringement, it would have made the
sales that were made by the infringer.""1 Second, by use of the
term "reasonable probability," the court seemed to mitigate the
forcefulness of the "but for test. Third, the use of the two terms
in the same sentence is contradictory. That is, this "reasonable
probability" appears to refer to the burden of proof. If so, then does
that heighten the "preponderance of the evidence" standard for
recovery in civil cases? Rather, the "reasonable probability"
" Cox, supra note 17, at 327 (emphasis added) (citing Rite.Hite Corp., 56 F.3d at 1543).
105 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
'06Rite-Hite Corp., 56 F.3d at 1546.10 Id. at 1545.
'
08 Id. at 1544.
1 Id. at 1545.
1 01 d. at 1544.
.. Rite-Hite Corp., 56 F.3d at 1545 (citing State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883
F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022 (1990)).
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apparently refers to the "but for" test. Does that, in effect,
transform the "but for" test into a "substantial factor" test?
In what appears to be an effort to rein in damage recovery, the
court proceeded to discuss proximate causation. The court stressed
that some limits on the patentee's recovery may exist112 and
referred to such unforeseeable consequences as an inventor's heart
attack or a drop in the value of the patent owner's corporate stock
as "not compensable."'13 Suddenly, Mrs. Palsgraf is hit with the
scales. The court held that "foreseeability" and "proximate
causation" had been satisfied here:
Rite-Hite's lost sales of the ADL-100, a product that
directly competed with the infringing product, were
reasonably foreseeable .... Being responsible for
lost sales of a competitive product is surely foresee-
able; such losses constitute the full compensation set
forth by Congress ... while staying well within the
traditional meaning of proximate cause. Such lost
sales should therefore clearly be compensable."'
After all but repudiating Panduit, the court still felt the need to
show how the facts continued to satisfy the Panduit test." 5 The
court stated that the only condition arguably not satisfied was the
second condition (noninfringing substitutes)"" and pointed to the
fact that the only competing and acceptable substitute came from
the plaintiff."7 The court stated, "[sluch a substitute was not an
'acceptable, non-infringing substitute' within the meaning of
Panduit because, being patented by Rite-Hite, it was not available
to customers except from Rite-Hite... Rite-Hite therefore would
not have lost sales to a third party."" 8
The result in Rite-Hite is probably fair. What is troubling,
however, is the Federal Circuit's failure to articulate a uniform
1 Id. at 1546.
13 Id.
114 Id.
Id. at 1548-49.
16 Rite-Hite Corp., 56 F.3d at 1548.
l Id.1 1 j
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basis for awarding lost profits. Notice the similarity between this
case and TWM, discussed supra, where the plaintiff received only
reasonable royalties. An infringer can only wonder "what is the
next test the court will announce?" Only three months after the
Rite-Hite decision, another decision took lost profit recovery one
step further.
b. King Instruments. In King Instruments Corp. v. Perego,"9
the Federal Circuit awarded lost profits on an invention that had
never been marketed or sold. 2° The facts were quite similar to
Rite-Hite, except that the patentee never sold the patented
invention. Nonetheless, the patentee sought to recover, and did
recover, his lost profits on a machine that was not infringed. 2 '
The court began with the Rite-Hite proposition "that a patent
owner who has suffered lost profits is entitled to lost profits
damages regardless of whether the patent owner has made, used,
or sold the patented device."'22 The rationale was that a defen-
dant may foresee that the infringement would result in lost profits
on other uninfringed products sold by King Instruments.' The
court found any gain or loss by the defendant irrelevant to the
plaintiff's recovery because the plaintiff sought to recover only his
own lost profits. 24 The court thus reaffirmed the test of "had the
infringer not infringed, what would the Patent Holder-Licensee
have made?""s
In calculating the plaintiffs damages, the court suggested that
the defendant's profits be used as a proxy for the plaintiffs lost
profits. 2 6 This "proxy" for calculation, however, cannot be justi-
fied. Earlier in its analysis, the court stated, incorrectly, 127 that
" 737 F. Supp. 1227 (D. Mass. 1990), affd en bane, 65 F.3d 941 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
'20 65 F.3d at 947.
121 Id.
2 Id. (citing Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, - U.S. -, 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995)).
'23 Id. at 948 n.3.
" King Instrument Corp., 65 F.3d at 948.
25Id. at 949 (quoting Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476,507
(1964) (quoting Livesay Window Co. v. Livesay Industries, Inc., 251 F.2d [469] at 471 (5th
Cir. 1958))).
s Id.
2 The proposition that the statute does not allow the defendant's profits will be criticized
and shown not to be true, infra. See discussion infra part IV.
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the patent statute was not to be construed so as to award the
infringer's profits."2 Nonetheless, when the court uses the defen-
dant's profits as a proxy, the court appears to adopt a method that
contradicts its own position. In effect, the court does award the
defendant's profits.
The proposition for which the court cited Rite-Hite, that exploita-
tion is irrelevant to lost profits recovery, is a misrepresentation of
Rite-Hite."2 In fact, the Rite-Hite court stated only that a paten-
tee's sale of the invention is not dispositive in calculating lost
profits, even though, "by definition," refusal to sell a patented
product prevents lost profits. 30 There, however, the plaintiff did
sell the inventions in question.'31 At most, the Rite-Hite court
reserved deciding the issue until another case; the "exploitation"
requirement was not explicitly repudiated by Rite-Hite. By virtue
of the distinguishing facts of Rite-Hite, the so-called holding of Rite-
Hite" is in fact dicta.
The King Instruments case, despite its misstatement, actually
constitutes the case that rejects the exploitation requirement for
lost profits recovery. Given that the patentee invests in his
invention with the expectation of reward,' 3' "[p]roviding lost
profits compensation in this case preserves those constitutional
incentives."' 34 To allow only a reasonable royalty for unexploited
technology may mean that some technology will not be disclosed by
inventors."6 When an inventor considers whether to profit (or
not) from his invention, his potential award in an infringement suit
should not drive his decision."3
Whether lost profits or reasonable royalties are awarded when
the plaintiff does not exploit the invention is a matter of proof as
to the quantum of damages. 37  Foreseeability' 38 and causa-
'" King Instruments Corp., 65 F.3d at 947-48.
' See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
'30 Rite-Hite Corp., 56 F.3d at 1548.
"'lId.
132 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
133 King Instruments Corp., 65 F.3d at 950. Even if the patentee chooses not to exploit,
he has sought the protection of the patent laws and all accompanying rights.
lu4 Id.
13 Id.
136 Id.
"'v Id. at 951.
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tion 39 appear to be the only requirements to establish a prima
facie claim for recovery of both types of damages.
The court proposed a hypothetical to demonstrate that the
exploitation requirement is fallacious." Suppose a plaintiff can
supply all its demand but does not want to license.14 A license
seeker would be unable to get a license.'42 "Willing negotiators
... would not agree to any royalty""3  because "[tihe value of
exercising the right to exclude is greater than the value of any
economically feasible royalty."'" In this scenario, the "reasonable
royalty" would not represent adequate compensation." 5 To allow
only reasonable royalties would enable the defendant to profit from
his wrongdoing. The King Instruments court identified the problem
of reasonable royalty awards by stating that, if the patentee desired
to license, he would have done so, and the award of a reasonable
royalty serves only to "give the infringer what the market de-
nied-a license."'"
The court further justified the award of lost profits on the ground
that a reasonable royalty is not punitive enough.147 In order to
remedy this disparity, courts have awarded treble damages,
attorney's fees, pre-judgment interest, and discretionary awards
that far exceed "reasonable royalties."' 48 Thus, "where plaintiffs
establish lost profits with reasonable probability, a lost profits
award reflecting actual damages is preferable to an essentially
arbitrary increase in a reasonable royalty.""4  As such, to com-
pensate the plaintiff adequately, "lost profits on competing products
not covered by the infringed claims" are justified."s
While this case is interesting in that the Federal Circuit correctly
1 8 King Instruments Corp., 65 F.3d at 948 n.3.
1
'Id. at 951.140 This is an argument we heard before. See supra discussion of Panduit.
141King Instruments Corp., 65 F.3d at 951.
14 2 Id.
143 Id.
144 id.
145 Id.
" King Instruments Corp., 65 F.3d at 951.
147 Id. at 951 n.6.
148 Id.
148 Id.
'50 Id. at 952.
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recognized the need to provide the plaintiff with more than
reasonable royalties, some of its rationale is suspect. First, a
plaintiff cannot be said to have lost profits if he did not manufac-
ture the patented device. The court evades this problem by
permitting the use of the defendant's profits as a proxy.
This premise presents a second flaw: what if the defendant is
extraordinarily efficient in its production? The court does not
adequately justify why the plaintiff should be allowed to recover the
fruits of efficiency that he would not have realized had he produced
the item himself. Further, what if the defendant is extraordinarily
inefficient so that the defendant realizes no profits? In such a case,
the plaintiff has not manufactured the device, and the defendant's
net profits are zero, so is the plaintiff left to recover only reasonable
royalties?
Third, the hypothetical proposed by the court-involving the
patentee who is unwilling to license-is inherently flawed for what
the court seeks to demonstrate. In the hypothetical, the manufac-
turer did manufacture the patented product. Thus, while demon-
strating that a reasonable royalty would be inadequate because the
manufacturing plaintiff does not want to license, the hypothetical
does not adequately address why a non-manufacturing plaintiff
should obtain "lost profits."
Fourth, by endorsing the other possible statutory remedies, such
as treble damages and attorney's fees, the court tries to prevent the
defendant from profiting from his own wrongdoing. In effect, the
court is forcing the defendant to disgorge his ill-gained benefits.
This type of recovery, however, sounds in unjust enrichment, which
this court explicitly rejected for patent infringement recovery.15'
III. RESTITUTION
A. BACKGROUND
Academics in the United States largely ignore the law of
restitution. 152 Not a single textbook canvasses the subject."s
" King Instruments Corp., 65 F.3d at 94748, 957 (Nies, J., dissenting-in-part).
m2 Laycock, supra note 6, at 1277; see also Kull supra note 5, at 1195 (arguing that
American lawyers do not understand restitution).
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Few schools teach courses dedicated to it," and those that do
tend to lump restitution with the law of remedies or contracts. 15
The American Law Institute's Restatement of Restitution1"
evidences this neglect as it remains unrevised since its initial
publication in the 1930's, and Professor George E. Palmer's
treatise,157 published in 1978, presents the only recent compre-
hensive treatment.
English authorities Goff & Jones tell us, "[tihe law of restitution
developed more quickly in the U.S.A. than in England, and was
undoubtedly helped to do so by the publication of the Restatement
of Restitution in 1937."' Even though English law matured
more slowly than its American counterpart, the English have
recently managed to rid, judicially, their law of common law fictions
and are left with a relatively clear body of law. Today, the
Commonwealth has such scholars as Lord Goff, Gareth Jones, Peter
Birks, and Andrew Burrows who all have authored books on the
subject and have shed much light on the law of restitution. We
gain from them an extremely helpful example in decrypting
restitution, its nature and objectives. The most obvious justifica-
tion for looking towards English law lies in the common legal
heritage shared by the United States and the Commonwealth.
B. HISTORY AND BASIC CONCEPTS
As stated previously, scholars commonly group the law of
restitution with the law of remedies. Such a classification is
erroneous because restitution has both remedial and substantive
aspects. 59 Restitution has its own cause of action: unjust enrich-
ment. (Some scholars use terms such as "quasi-contract" or
15 Laycock, supra note 6, at 1277. See also Kull supra note 5, at 1195. Perhaps the
closest casebook is Professor Leavell's Equitable Remedies, Restitution and Damages.
ROBERT N. LEAVELL ET AL., EQUITABLE REMEDIES, RESTITTIoN AND DAMAGES (6th ed. 1994).
"' See Laycock, supra note 6, at 1277. See also Kull supra note 5, at 1195.
15 LEAVELL, supra note 153.
IN RESTATEMENT OF RESTrrroN (1937).
157 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION (1978).
15 LORD GOFF OF CHIEVELEY & GARETH JONES, THE LAW OF RESTTTON 12 n.63
(Gareth Jones, ed., 4th ed. 1993) [hereinafter GOFF & JONES].
" PETER BIRKS, RESTITUTION - THE FUTURE 1 (1992).
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"implied contract" to refer to the same idea.)' "A [claim for
unjust enrichment] is for the benefit, the enrichment, gained by the
defendant at the plaintiffs expense; it is not one for loss suf-
fered."'' In other words, unjust enrichment occurs when the
plaintiff has conferred a benefit on the defendant which justice
dictates that the defendant should return."2  Benefits may
include money,' services,'" goods," land, or use of
someone's assets.
167
Every inquiry into a restitutionary problem should
pass through these stages: (1) Has the defendant
been enriched? (2) If so, was that enrichment at the
plaintiffs expense? (3) If so, which sense of "at the
expense of" is relied upon, and, in particular, is it
(3a) "by subtraction from" the plaintiff, or (3b) "by
committing a wrong to" him? (4) If the latter,
namely (3b), is the wrong done to the plaintiff one for
which a restitutionary remedy lies? (5) If so, is there
nonetheless some countervailing factor which re-
quires that restitutionary remedy to be withheld? (6)
If the former, namely (3a), is there a ground for
restitution - a factor which the law recognises as
"60 One approach above all has traditionally led to restitution being pushed into the
shade of contract and tort: the 'implied contract' theory. According to this, most of the
common law part of restitution (which comprises the bulk of the subject) is satisfactorily
explained as resting on an implied promise by the defendant to pay the plaintiff. This area
of the law is therefore seen merely as an adjunct to the law of contract: hence the label
'quasi-contract.' " ANDREW BURROWS, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 2 (1993). Clearly, the quasi-
contract rationale is improper since there is not even a contract of which to speak. These
situations lack a "promise" as well as any "bargaining." PETER BnKS, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 29-39 (rev. 1989). As such, "[wihere the law imposes an obligation
to pay for benefits conferred in the absence of contract, the ordinary measure of recovery is
therefore defendant's gain, not plaintiff's cost." Kull supra note 5, at 1201.
1s GOFF & JONES, supra note 158, at 16. "[T]he concept of benefit is in English law not
synonymous with that of objective enrichment (in the sense that the wealth of the defendant
has increased), but also embraces expense saved." Id.
'6 Id. at 12.
'
63Id. at 17.
R Id. at 18.
165 GOFF & JONES, supra note 158, at 27.
166 Id.
167 Id.
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rendering the enrichment unjust? (7) If so, is there
nonetheless some countervailing factor which re-
quires that restitution be disallowed?'
The distinction between substantive and remedial restitution is
based on the answer to this question: What is our basis for finding
that the defendant was enriched at the plaintiff's expense?169 In
making this determination, one must remember that enrichment
may occur in two ways: in a subtractive sense and an additive
sense. The "subtractive" form occurs when the plaintiff has lost
wealth that the defendant now possesses. 7 ' The "additive" form
arises when the defendant has received a benefit by committing a
tort and restitution is remedial.
17 1
Substantive restitution is commonly known as "unjust enrich-
ment." Here, the basis of the plaintiff's claim sounds not in tort,
but rather in something outside the law of torts or contracts,
something that makes retention of a benefit by the defendant
unjust.172 These sub-categories include payment by mistake,
compulsion, and failure of consideration.'73
To this day, many American cases use the language of action for
money had and received, assumpsit, indebitatus assumpsit,
replevin, quantum meruit, quantum valebant, and the like to
describe various causes of action in unjust enrichment. 174 These
terms are nothing more than fictions developed in the common law
for the purposes of pleadings-words that hide the nature of the
claim.175 In fact, the English Common Law Procedure Act of 1852
"provided that it should no longer be necessary to mention any form
or cause of action in the writ." 176  Yet, attorneys continued to
cling to the familiar language lest they be considered to have
1 BIRKS, supra note 159, at 41. For a similar formulation, 8ee BURROWS supra note 160,
at 7.
169 BIRKS, supra note 159, at 1.
170 Id. at 1-2.
17 Id.
'7 SiR P.H. WINFIELD, THE LAW OF QuAsi-CONTRACTS 2-3 (1952).
173 GOFF & JONES, supra note 158, at 3.
174 BUMS, supra note 159, at 88-89.
17 GOFF & JONES, supra note 158, at 5.
176 Id at 5 n. 9.
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improperly pleaded a complaint.""7 Goff & Jones argue that such
fictions should not obscure claims grounded in unjust enrich-
ment. 7 ' Once those forms of action were deleted, litigants
needed to devise a method for classifying their claims. "This they
found in the dichotomy of contract and tort; and the apparently
intractable quasi-contractual claims were relegated to the status of
an appendix of the law of contract.n
179
Remedial restitution, on the other hand, addresses "whether the
victim of a wrong can obtain restitution of gains made by the
wrongdoer through the wrong.""s The recovery is remedial in the
sense that this form of restitution does not create a cause of action
but rather identifies which civil wrongs may be remedied through
restitution.'l8  Thus, "it is not the business of the law of restitu-
tion to define the tort of conversion, but it is its business to find out
whether and why that tort gives rise not merely to compensation but
also to restitution."82
In this context, the common law developed the fiction of "waiver
of tort" that likewise should be eliminated. As stated previously,
when a tort is committed, a plaintiff can pursue a cause of action
in tort or in unjust enrichment. However, the common law had
held that one who sued in unjust enrichment waived the tort.'83
"But the tort is not extinguished. Indeed it is said that it is a sine
qua non of both remedies that [the plaintiff] should establish that
1
"Oxford University Professor Peter Birks vigorously argued against the fictions:
Although [these fictions] did draw from ... a body of law recognising
non-contractual restitutionary obligations in respect of value received
other than in money, the shadow of the allegation of request, and the
almost underhand means of escaping it, had the effect of producing law
that was virtually impossible to match up with the law derived from the
action for money had and received. In the result common lawyers have
never managed to habituate themselves to the relatively straightforward
proposition that there can be only one law for all value received and that
the facts which trigger restitution of value received in the form of money
must equally trigger restitution of value received in other forms.
BnRKS, supra note 159, at 90-91.
178 GOFF & JONES, supra note 158, at 5.
179 Id. at 9.
" BumK, supra note 159, at 1.
I1 Id.
'Id. (emphasis added).183 Id. at 11.
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a tort has been committed."' 84
The matter should have been settled in 1941 when United
Australia Ltd. v. Barclays Bank Ltd."M held that by first bringing
a suit for money had and received, and later amending to sue only
for the tort, a plaintiff did not waive the tort.
The cause of action remained unchanged. The tort of
conversion had two remedial strings. As Lord Atkin
pointed out, it was therefore not a matter of opting
between inconsistent rights but only of choosing
between alternative remedies, a choice which re-
mained open until judgment: a plaintiff could not
have judgment for both restitution and compensa-
tion.1"
In 1984, however, Dean Prosser's hornbook retained the "waiver"
concept."17 The analysis appears to emanate from a confusion
between contract and restitution. Dean Prosser did not seem to
accept the idea that restitution and contract are wholly sepa-
rate." His argument is grounded in the old case of Lamine v.
Dorrell,8 9 which first advanced the "waiver of tort"; but, as
Professor Birks stated, the matter should have been settled after
United Australia.19°
Two justifications can be offered for the distinction between
subtractive and tort based cases of unjust enrichment. First, the
defenses normally available to a defendant against whom a
restitution claim is asserted, like change of position, estoppel, and
bona fide purchaser, are not usually available under the tort based
cause of action. Theoretically, since such defenses are based on
184 GOFF & JONES, supra note 158, at 714.
'8 [1941] A.C. 1.
6 BIKS, supra note 159, at 11.
187 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 94 at 672-75
(5th ed. 1984).
"8 Id.
189 92 Eng. Rep. 303 (1705). "If a man takes goods to which he has no right, and sells
them, the owner may waive the tort, and recover the price for which they were sold in an
indebitatus assumpsit for money had and received." Id. at 303.
"' BIRKS, supra note 159, at 11.
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"good faith," they cannot be available to a tortfeasor.'' Second,
as has been demonstrated, describing them along these two
branches makes "restitution" easier to understand.
One of the leading American scholars on the subject, Professor
Andrew Kull, takes issue with the distinction.' He begins by
saying that the law of restitution is exclusively the law of unjust
enrichment.19  He asserts that the guiding principles are: (i)
that no restitution liability exists other than that attributable to
the defendant's unjust enrichment; and (ii) that the defendant's
enrichment provides the sole measure of recovery.1 ' As such, for
a restitution claim, the benefit to the defendant, not the plaintiffs
cost (harm to the plaintiff), is the basis for recovery.'" Therefore,
"[w]here a defendant has committed a profitable wrong, the
essential thing is to recognize that the law offers the plaintiff a
choice of remedies, among them a monetary recovery measured
either by harm to the plaintiff or benefit to the defendant."196
The "substantive-remedial" distinction advanced by Professor Birks
is unduly rigid and nothing more than a relic left behind by the
common law.1 97 The distinction should have been expunged with
the waiver of tort.'
Professor Kull states that so long as the plaintiff seeks to recover
the unjust enrichment, the basis of the remedy does not mat-
ter-whether it sounds in tort or in the defendant's unfair gain at
the plaintiff's expense.19 He further rejects the proposition that
the availability of defenses should justify the distinction; he argues
that so long as the defendant must show good faith to have the
defenses, then, naturally, such a showing would not be likely in a
tort based case." So long as the election for a restitutionary
recovery is based on unjust enrichment, the distinction is unneces-
sary.2° '
191 Interview with Andrew Kull, supra note 9.
1 See generally Kull, supra note 5.
19 Id. at 1196.
194Id.
l Id. at 1200.
'9 Id. at 1222.
'9 Interview with Andrew Kull, supra note 9.19 6 1&
" Kull, supra note 5, at 1222.
2w0 Interview with Andrew Kull, supra note 9.
201 Kull, supra note 5, at 1225.
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With this historical and conceptual backdrop, one can begin to
consider the analysis that should take place in a particular claim.
C. AVAILABLE DAMAGES
At common law,
It is well known that, both in trade-mark cases and
patent cases, the plaintiff is entitled, if he succeeds
in getting an injunction, to take either of two forms
of relief; he may either say, 'I claim from you the
damage I have sustained from your wrongful act,' or
'I claim from you the profit which you have made by
your wrongful act.'2
Where the defendant does not act wilfully, a reasonable rental
value of the patent is appropriate recovery."' In all cases, an
accounting should be discretionary, and the court should retain
discretion to deny such recovery even with respect to a wilful
wrongdoer.'
There are some considerations that are worth noting. First, Goff
& Jones state that in the case of patent infringement, the courts
often apportion profits in recognition of the infringer's "contribu-
tion, ideas and financial input."205 The courts recognize Lord
Watson's idea that a patentee should only recover those profits
" 'earned by use of his invention.' " Second, a plaintiff should
be able to claim the amount that the tortfeasor saves by, for
example, not engaging in research and development.' Third,
the unconscious infringer should have to pay only "the reasonable
Peter Pan Mfg. Corp. v. Corsets Silhouette, Ltd., [1963] RPC 45, 59 (quoting Lever v.
Goodwin, [1887] 36 Ch.D. 1, 7).
Interview with Andrew Kull, supra note 9.
i", GOFF & JONES, supra note 158, at 727. This provision appears to provide a safety
valve in the law of restitution. It helps to preserve the maxim ex aequo et bono.
u Id. at 34 (quoting United Horse Shoe and Nail Co. Ltd. v. Stewart & Co., 5 R.P.C. 260,
266-67 (1888)). A court might have to consider an allowance to the defendant for his skills
in getting those profits and whether he should be compensated for his expenses. Id. at 32.
-o GOFF & JONES, supra note 158, at 17 & 726. See also Gordon, supra note 81, at 239.
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value" for the use of the patent.208 Fourth, restitution is improp-
er where its application makes the defendant, in the net, worse off
than he would have been absent the infringement. m To allow
otherwise would undermine the market and burden the courts. 210
D. CULPABILITY
One frustrated author wrote, "[t]oo many instances have arisen
where infringers, secure in the knowledge that nothing more than
a compulsory license at an established royalty rate will be the price
of infringement, have deliberately forced the burden and expense
of litigation upon patent owners."2 The law of restitution
concurs and addresses the author's concern by ensuring that the
defendant's culpability determines the type of award that a plaintiff
receives. Goff & Jones state the general rule: while an innocent
tortfeasor most frequently needs to pay only a reasonable licensing
fee, in the most exceptional cases, the courts may require an
accounting of even that innocent tortfeasor's profits "in order to
dissuade other[s] ... from the temptation of profiting [unfair-ly]." 12
In the case of the wilful patent infringer, a plaintiff can either
sue and claim his own damages, or he can sue on a restitution
based theory and seek the infringer's profits. The patent laws
currently allow for treble damages,213 pre-judgment interest,2 14
and attorneys fees.215 Those damages are awarded to punish and
only where the defendant was culpable or exercised bad faith.216
2m Interview with Andrew Kull, supra note 9. While courts admit that such a figure is
inflated in order to compensate the plaintiff properly, under a restitution theory, this value
should be a true reflection of the price of a license.
2o Gordon, supra note 81, at 219.
210 Id. at 219-20.
211 See also Filardi supra note 17, at 58.
21 GOFF & JONES, supra note 158, at 727. Professor Dawson disagrees and argues that
culpability is irrelevant. Coleman, supra note 22, at 110. This view represents a minority
opinion and is virtually foreign to the law of restitution. For example, Professor Palmer
disagreed: "[fMor an unintended wrong, restitution of profits is often a harsh remedy." Id.
at 110 n.120 (quoting Palmer, supra note 157, at § 2.12, at 164-66).
2'3 35 U.S.C. § 284.
214 Id.
216 Id. § 285 (1994).
218 Filardi, supra note 17, at 84.
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On the other hand, "the honest defendant may be required to
make restitution, but not necessarily to account for profits."217
Another authority agrees and states that, where a defendant does
not act willfully, a court should be sympathetic.218 Further, the
English patent statute distinguishes between willful and innocent
infringers.219 Clearly, the rationale for the distinction is that the
honest infringer cannot be deterred since he did not intend to
infringe in the first place.
However, the culpability of the infringer is an evidentiary matter.
For example, a defendant might show proof of diligent consultation
with a patent lawyer.22 Also, one could construct an argument
that infringers are on notice by the mere existence of the patent
system.221  Goff & Jones recognize such an exception to the
general rule where a court may require an accounting by the
innocent infringer: "the plaintiff may have an interest which the
courts wish to protect. These include such economic interests as
title to property and, in other common law jurisdictions, the right
to exploit one's own personality. A court may then, for this reason
deprive even an innocent wrongdoer of his profits."222 Whether
the courts should adopt such a rule is a policy matter that exceeds
the scope of this Note.2'
Edwards v. Lee's Administrator224 is often cited as the prototyp-
ical restitution case. It involved litigation about the "Great Onyx
Cave,"22 where Edwards and his wife discovered a cave beneath
their property.22 Seeking to capitalize on their discovery, they
217 GOFF & JONES, supra note 158, at 31.
• Gordon, supra note 81, at 206-07.
21 GOFF & JONES, supra note 158, at 727 (citing The Patent Act 1977 §§ 61 & 62).
2 Lorig, supra note 26, at 391-92. Note that such a showing may necessitate a waiver
of the attorney-cient privilege. Id.
'A constitutional argument would be especially appropriate.
GOFF & JONES, supra note 158, at 32.
n The English copyright statute treats less harshly "the infringer who did not know and
had no reason to believe that he was infringing copyright; it is a defense solely to an action
for damages, not any other remedy, that he did not know and had no reason to know that
he was infringing copyright. If these common law and statutory analogies are followed, then
the extent of the wrongdoers liability, and in particular that of tortfeasors, may depend on
the court's characterization of the conduct of the wrongdoer." Id.
n4 96 S.W.2d 1028 (Ky. 1936).
m d, at 1028.
SId
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solicited tourists.227 Lee, however, discovered that a portion of
the cave was below his land, and Lee sued21 seeking an account-
ing of the net profits that Edwards received.
The court found that the trespass was willfulm and held that
"[a] person who tortiously uses a trade name, trade secret, profit A
prendre, or other similar interest of another, is under a duty of
restitution for the value of the benefit thereby received."' The
court further held an accounting to be the proper measure of
recovery,231 and reasoned that, even though "there may be no
tangible loss other than the violation of a right[,]... [a] wrongdoer
shall not be permitted to make a profit from his own wrong."12
The role of culpability is thus simple. Where the defendant's
behavior indicates bad faith, there is a stronger nexus between the
plaintiffs award and the defendant's wrongdoing. 2" Further, it
is a given that the defendant's sales are known and that no one can
determine the number of sales the plaintiff would have generated
absent the infringement.' Those two factors, together, balance
in favor of placing the onus on the defendant and forcing him to
disgorge his intentionally and tortiously acquired gaines. Thus, the
deterent effect of restitution is realized.
E. APPLICATION
For reference, consider this hypothetical: Jane Owner has a
large vegetable garden. Jane grows tomatoes, far more than she
can ever consume. She leaves the extra tomatoes on the vines and
they rot. One day, Tommy Trespasser comes onto her property,
walks carefully so as not to damage any of Jane's property and
takes bushels of tomatoes that Jane was planning on leaving to rot.
Tommy goes to the market and sells the tomatoes for $100. Jane
227 Id. at 1028-29.
Edwards, 96 S.W.2d at 1029.
Id.
230 Id. at 1032 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF RESTrTUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT, Part
I, § 136 (Proposed Final Draft 1936)).
23 1 d. at 1032.
= Id.
" Laycock, supra note 6, at 1289.
m Id. at 1287.
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finds out about Tommy's trespass and decides to sue.'
Jane has several alternatives. She may sue in tort for trespass
or conversion and seek compensation for the damages and any
accompanying punitive damages. She may also sue in unjust
enrichment under the substantive and remedial species. 2  Her
substantive claim might be that Tommy took her tomatoes (an
asset) without her knowledge and added to his wealth unjustly.
Her remedial claim would be based in the tort of trespass or
conversion for which she now seeks renumeration.
Suing in tort might be unwise. Jane would receive only compen-
sation for the damages proximately caused by Tommy's wrongful
act. Recall that there was no damage to her land because Tommy
was careful in his trespass and because Jane was planning to leave
the tomatoes to rot. Her only claim would be for the damage
caused by the theft; and because she suffered no actual damages,
her recovery would be nominal. Also, punitive damages would be
minimal considering that the actual harm was negligible.2 7
In order to analyze her unjust enrichment claims we consider
Professor Birks's recommended process. 28 First, the court must
determine whether the defendant has been enriched. 9  Here,
Tommy has been enriched by the amount of $100. The next
question is whether Tommy was enriched "by subtraction from"
Jane.240 The answer is yes; he took Jane's property, an asset.
When we ask the next question-if there is a basis that causes this
enrichment to be unjust-again, the answer is yes. The tomatoes
were taken without her knowledge and during a trespass. She
would not have chosen to give them to him, and he had no right to
them. That she would have let the tomatoes rot is irrelevant; her
title to the property is the basis for her claim.24' Thus, Jane has
now stated a prima facie case that "Tommy gained at her expense."
"' The criminal implications are irrelevant for the purposes of this discussion.
We will utilize Professor Birks's paradigm for demonstrative purposes. Regardless of
whether one accepts Professor Birks's view or Professor Kull's distinctionless scheme, the
results are the same.
2"7 It is true that she might receive punitive damages in substantial excess of the cost of
the tomatoes.
m See supra note 168, 169 and accompanying text.
2s BIRKS, supr note 159, at 41.
"0 Id. at 41.
4 GOFF & JONES, supra note 158, at 41-42.
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Possible damages would be either the wholesale value of the
tomatoes (being analogous to the rental value) or their retail value.
Tommy may now answer question (7) in Professor Birks's
process, regarding countervailing factors, by arguing that he did
not know that Jane owned the tomatoes.' We may also inquire
into what might be called "set-offs." For example, consider that
Tommy spent $20 to advertise for the sale of the tomatoes. Tommy
is entitled to that set-off against his liability.' Consider, fur-
ther, that Tommy spent the $100 on an investment that he has now
lost. This might be termed a "change of position* defense.'
Consider now a claim grounded in the tort of conversion. We
would answer the first and second questions the same way. With
respect to the third question--did Tommy commit a tort?-the
answer is yes. He stole tomatoes that did not belong to him and
sold them. Once again, Tommy may state that he thought he had
a right to the tomatoes, and that would be relevant to mitigating
his liability. With respect to defenses, Tommy's options become
more limited.2"
As previously noted, Tommy might answer question (7) by saying
that he thought he had a right to the tomatoes; that is, that he did
not act willfully. "[Tihe honest defendant may be required to make
restitution, but not necessarily to account for profits."2' If a
court finds that Tommy knew or should have known that he was
trespassing, then he did not act in good faith and must disgorge all
his profits.247  Goff & Jones give the example of someone who
commits a breach of confidence: only if the defendant acted
2" This is relevant with respect to whether Jane will be able to get an accounting.
20 If not for the advertising, Tommy may not have realized any profit.
2" "The right of a person to restitution from another because of a benefit received is
terminated or diminished if, after the receipt of the benefit, circumstances have so changed
that it would be inequitable to require the other to make full restitution." RESTATEMENT OF
RESTITUTION, supra note 1, at § 142(1).
' See supra notes 191 and 200 and accompanying text (discussing available defenses).
There is authority that, for a tortfeasor, some defenses are not available. S, eg., GOFF &
JONES, supra note 158, at 31 et seq.
2id. at 31.
"7 As illustrated by Jane and Tommy, a plaintiff does not have a right to an account. *It
is an equitable remedy granted at the court's discretion.* GOF & JONES, supra note 158,
at 28.
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knowingly should he account.24 If a court finds that Tommy did
not know and had no reason to know that this was Jane's property,
the measure of recovery would be, by process of elimination,
compensation to Jane for her loss measured by the wholesale price
of the tomatoes. Presumably, the price to Tommy would be lower
than the $100 he earned.
IV. THE CASE FOR RESTITUTION
A. HISTORY
Decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the
nineteenth century established that in a suit in
equity for infringement of patent or copyright, the
patent or copyright holder was entitled to recover the
profits made through the infringement. Although
the Court sometimes explained this as a method for
measuring the plaintiffs damages, it was clear that
the relief was based on unjust enrichment, as the
Court later recognized.249
In an action in equity, an independent basis for an injunction exists
alongside potential monetary awards.' That basis forces the
defendant to cease the infringing behavior. Otherwise, the plaintiff
could only pursue an action at law where the defendant's profits
could not be recovered. 251 Prior to 1946, the statute stated that
"the complainant shall be entitled to recover, in addition to the
profits to be accounted for by the defendant, the damages the
complainant has sustained thereby. "1 2 35 U.S.C. § 284, as it is
known today, eliminated the distinction between actions at law and
m Id. at 727. Note, English intellectual property statutes make this distinction. Id.
Section 284 does not make an explicit distinction but intellectual property case law seems
to acknowledge the distinction.
u PALMER, supra note 157, § 2.7 at 87-88 (citations omitted).
o Id. at 88 (citing Stevens v. Gladding, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 447, 455 (1854) ('The right to
account for profits is incident to the right to an injunction in copy and patent-right cases.")).
6lId. at 90.
" Kori Corp. v. Wilco Marsh Buggies & Draglines, Inc., 761 F.2d 649, 654, 225 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 985 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 902 (1985) (quoting R.S. 4921).
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those in equity.' The amendments raised the issue of whether
courts could still allow recovery based on unjust enrichment.'"
The case law seems to have embraced the incorrect view that the
amendment sought to eliminate recovery based on unjust enrich-
ment. 5 The most often quoted case for this proposition is the
1964 case Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement
Co. 256 Prior to this case, judges, lawyers, and academics took for
granted that a patentee could recover the infringer's profits. 7
As late as 1963, one court stated that "an infringer's profits are a
traditional measure of damages."' However, in Aro, the Su-
preme Court stated, "[tihe purpose of the change was precisely to
eliminate the recovery of profits as such and allow recovery of
damages only." 9 The Court relied on the literal language of the
statute to distinguish between the two types of recovery: "[i]n
patent nomenclature what the infringer makes is 'profits'; what the
owner of the patent loses by such infringement is 'damages.'"'
The Supreme Court, in another case, cited a House Report to
further justify its position that recovery should not include the
defendant's profits and stated, "Congress sought to ensure that the
patent owner would in fact receive full compensation for 'any
damages' he suffered as a result of the infringement." 1 The
Court noted that the amendment intended to eliminate time-
consuming litigation required for the plaintiff to prove the quantum
of the defendant's profits. 2
2 PALMER, supra note 157, § 2.7 at 90-91 & n.21.
" Id. at 91.
' General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 494 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Del. 1980), affid, 667 F.2d
347 (3d. Cir. 1981), affd, 461 U.S. 648, 654 (1983). See also Kori Corp. v. Wilco Marsh
Buggies & Draglines, Inc., 761 F.2d at 654.
2" 312 F.2d 52 (1st Cir. 1962), modified, 377 U.S. 476 (1964).
2 Interview with Andrew Kull, supra note 9.
PALMER, supra note 157, § 2.7 at 91 (quoting Zysset v. Popeil Brothers, 318 F.2d 701,
707 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 913. (1964)).
Aro Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., Inc., 377 U.S. 476, 505 (1964).
Id. (quoting Duplate Corp. v. Triplex Safety Glass Co., 298 U.S. 448, 451 (1936)).
"' General Motors Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 654-55 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1587, 79th Cong.,
2d Sess., at 1 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1386, 1387).
2
" Id. at 654.
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B. JUSTIFICATION
Central to this Note is the fact that Congress did not intend this
result. In fact, the very House Report that the Supreme Court
cited did not mention an intent to eliminate recovery of the
defendant's profits.2"
The object of the bill is to make the basis of recovery
in patent-infringement suits general damages, that
is, any damages the complainant can prove, not less
than a reasonable royalty, together with interest
from the time infringement occurred, rather than
profits and damages.
Although the bill would not preclude the recovery of
profits as an element of general damages, yet by
making it unnecessary to have proceedings before
masters and empowering equity courts to assess
general damages irrespective of profits, the measure
represents proposed legislation which in the judg-
ment of the committee is long overdue.'"
Congress uses the word "damages" generically. Congress did not
appear to intend for the term to be interpreted as simply tradition-
al tort damages or lost profits. If there is any doubt, then the last
sentence in the quoted excerpt should dispel it. Even there, the
infringer's profits are referred to as "an element of general damag-
es. "
265
Congress's reformation of the patent law intended to eliminate
some peculiarities in the then existing statute. Since the patentee
was able to recover damages and profits, there was an unfair
element of double counting.26 This double counting is contrary
to the concept of unjust enrichment. In fact, some courts have
suggested that such double recovery was used as a method of
H.R. REP. No. 1587, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., at 1 (1946).
2 1d. at 1-2 (emphasis added).
2Id. at 2.
2 Kori Corp., 761 F.2d at 654.
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harassing defendants.6 7
The House Report indicated that the amendment was necessary
because plaintiffs had difficulty recovering for infringement because
of the time-consuming litigation.' This delay was caused by the
difficulty that plaintiffs had in showing the extent of the defen-
dant's profits.269  Thus, Congress enacted the amendment to
facilitate patentees' recovery, not to lower their recovery.
In his treatise, The Law of Restitution, Professor Palmer was
likewise puzzled by the judicial interpretation of § 284. He
criticized Justice Brennan's statement in Aro "that the statute
'allows the award of a reasonable royalty, or of any other recovery,
only if such amount constitutes 'damages' for the infringe-
ment.' 270 He wrote that the statute clearly referred to unjust
enrichment, for "reasonable royalty" stems from restitution princi-
ples-"the fair market value of the interest wrongfully used or
misappropriated by a tortfeasor" 271 He added that the use of the
label "damages" is not dispositive because courts and legislatures
have, on other occasions, referred to unjust enrichment awards as
"damages. "272
In the case of the willful infringer, the plaintiff should be entitled
to the defendant's profits,273 yet courts have interpreted the
change to preclude profits.27' Interestingly, our copyright in-
fringement law has consistently allowed for recovery of profits,275
and in 1946, Congress allowed recovery of profits for trademark
infringement.276 Professor Palmer goes on to say that, even
though the rationale for the amendment is unclear, it appears that
"the amendment was approved without adequate consideration or
understanding of the then existing law or the changes intended to
W7 id.
m H.R. REP. No. 1587, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., at 1 (1946), reprinted in 1046 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1386, 1387.
m Id.
270 PALMER, supra note 157, § 2.7 at 93 (quoting Aro Mfg. Co., Inc., 377 U.S. at 505).
21Id. at 94.
- Id. at 93-94.
273 PALMER, supra note 157, § 2.7 at 94.274 Id.
275 17 U.S.C. § 504 (1994). The statute is carefully tailored as not to allow for double
counting.
276 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1982 & Supp. H 1996).
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be effected. 277
In an interview with the Author, Professor Kull expressed similar
disapproval of the case law. 27' He stated that, so long as double
counting is not allowed in a recovery, a patentee should be able to
recover a willful infringer's profits or, at a minimum, reasonable
royalties.279 Where the defendant is not acting willfully, a paten-
tee should recover reasonable royalties or lost profit damages.'
Essentially, a plaintiff would elect either to pursue a tort based
theory of recovery or an unjust enrichment theory of recovery,'
and neither of these alternatives should run afoul of the statutory
language. 2
At the outset, the exclusive enjoyment of intellectual property
rights is the basis for restitutionary recoveryr2. "These property
rights prohibit exploitation without consent even if the property
owner is unwilling or unable to exploit the right for himself."VI
By its very nature, intellectual property law does stifle competition
to some extent. 285 Nevertheless, such stifling is desirable if
inventors and authors are to be encouraged to create. One observer
stated that even though patent rights are by their nature anti-
competitive, an infringer's violation of the law is similarly anti-
competitive.' Thus, while the patent laws deter unfair competi-
tion, "it must be observed that the competition at issue is certainly
unfair in nature; the infringer violates a lawful right of the
patentee. The profits wrongfully obtained can only be thought of
in terms of unjust enrichment. "1 7  Another observer wrote,
"[i]nherent in the right to exclusive enjoyment is the entitlement to
the benefits derived from the property. Therefore, an appropriation
of the benefits consists of a compensable wrong because this
.. PALMER, supra note 157, § 2.7 at 94 (quoting Note, 60 COLuM. L. REV. 840, 842
(1960)).
278 Interview with Andrew Kull, supra note 9.
m Id.
2W Id.
281 ld,
282 id.
' Coleman, supra note 22, at 108.
2 Id. at 103.
' Gordon, supra note 81, at 158.
Filardi, supra note 17, at 86.
287 Id.
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appropriation gives rise to an enrichment to the wrongdoer that is
necessarily at the expense of the owner's right."'
Likewise, an unjust enrichment award also possesses a deterrent
aspect. 9  Here, the focus is on the unfairness of allowing a
defendant to retain his wrongfully acquired gains.' Further, the
courts are reaching the same result as in an unjust enrichment
award, more or less, by awarding treble damages and other
enhanced damages for willful infringement. 1 If courts were to
accept a restitutionary recovery based theory, whether enhanced
damages should still be allowed would be a policy issue. That is,
one can easily see an argument that the constitutional mandate for
intellectual property protection, coupled with a desire of the patent
system to foster invention, may justify a further award of such
damages. Perhaps it would be wise to allow trebling only in the
most egregious willful infringement cases.
V. CONCLUSION
The American courts have improperly interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 284
to allow a plaintiff in a patent infringement case either the
plaintiff's lost profits or a reasonable royalty. While the courts
have exercised suspect methodology, theoretically, the result is
acceptable. What is unacceptable is how courts have managed to
read the 1946 amendment of the patent code as eliminating the
traditional remedy of an accounting for the infringer's profits. Such
a reading is without basis. In fact, Congress appears to have
intended to preserve the option of a restitutionary recovery. One
author even suggested that § 284 be amended to provide explicitly
for unjust enrichment recovery.292 That is not necessary.
2" Coleman, supra note 22, at 103.
l Id. at 104.
9
0 Id.
2" Id. at 116.
m Filardi, supra note 17, at 87. "Section 284 of 35 U.S.C. should be amended to enable
the patent owner to recover directly that portion of the infringer's profits which are unjust.
While a party entitled to lost profits should not be permitted to obtain double recovery, the
unjust profit enrichment of the infringer should be directly recoverable as the cost of unfair
competition, i.e., wrongful infringement, even if not willful." Id. Though otherwise accurate,
such a provision is contrary to the laws of unjust enrichment if it does not consider
culpability.
1996]
37
Mohamed: Unjust Enrichment for Patent Infringement: A Novel Idea?
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 1996
J. INTELL. PROP. L.
Professor Kull argues that patent law is part of the law of
restitution, per se. 3 In fact, one would have difficulty locating
a book on the law of restitution that does not address patent
infringement. So long as the defendant gains a benefit,' restitu-
tion for patent violations should be available even where the
defendant's gain bears no relation to the plaintiff's loss.' Judge
Posner poignantly stated in a copyright case,
It is true that if the infringer makes greater profits
than the copyright owner lost, because the infringer
is a more efficient producer than the owner or sells
in a different market, the owner is allowed to cap-
ture the additional profit even though it does not
represent a loss to him. It may seem wrong to
penalize the infringer for his superior efficiency and
give the owner a windfall. But it discourages in-
fringement. By preventing infringers from obtaining
any net profit it makes any would-be infringer
negotiate directly with the owner of a copyright that
he wants to use, rather than bypass the market by
stealing the copyright and forcing the owner to seek
compensation from the courts for his loss. Since the
infringer's gain might exceed the owner's loss,
especially as loss is measured by a court, limiting
damages to that loss would not effectively deter this
kind of forced exchange. This analysis also implies
that some of the "windfall" may actually be profit
that the owner would have obtained from licensing
his copyright to the infringer had the infringer
sought a license.'
Interview with Andrew Kull, supra note 9.
GOFF & JONES, supra note 158, at 716.
29 Gordon, supra note 81, at 239.
Coleman, supra note 22, at 115-16 (quoting Taylor v. Merick, 712 F.2d 1112-1120 (7th
Cir. 1983)). The Author takes issue with the suggestion that there is a windfall with
restitutionary recovery. What the plaintiff receives in such a case is the amount to which
he is entitled. His constitutional protections have been violated by an infringer, and all that
the plaintiff seeks is what is rightfully his ab initio.
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Professor Kull states that a great number of recently reported
American restitution cases are presented by lawyers and judges
who do not understand its fundamental concepts." Perhaps that
is the reason why unjust enrichment has fallen from favor in the
patent context. Hopefully, this Note will shed some light on the
subject and offer a paradigm for analysis of claims. This Note does
not offer a novelty, but rather a rediscovery of unjust enrichment.
"With renewed accessibility and corresponding professional atten-
tion, the [law of restitution] might flourish again in the United
States as it now does elsewhere in the common-law world. 2m
MOHAMED YUSUF M. MOHAMED*
Kull, supra note 5, at 1241.
2Id. at 1197.
* Thanks to Professors Peter Birks (Oxford University), Paul Heald (University of
Georgia), Andrew Kull (Emory University), and R. P. Sentell, Jr. (University of Georgia) for
their invaluable input and contributions.
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